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High-Assurance System Support through 3-D Integration
Abstract
While hardware resources, in the form of both transistors and full microprocessor cores, are now fairly
abundant, economic factors continue to prevent the integration into commodity parts of specialized hard-
ware mechanisms required for secure processing. Multi-core processors, due to their wide adoption, im-
pressive performance, and low cost, are very attractive platforms for computation. Unfortunately, highly
secure processing of sensitive information on such platforms is extremely difficult to achieve due to extensive
resource sharing and the lack of strong security primitives. In this paper we propose that commodity inte-
grated circuits, with some very minor modifications, could be enhanced with a separate silicon layer used
to enforce strong isolation, reference monitoring, and other useful security properties. A separate layer,
stacked using 3-D integration, allows us to decouple the function and economics of high assurance policy
enforcement mechanisms from the underlying high-performance computing hardware. We describe 3-D in-
tegration, how the host layer may be modified, and as our working example, we show how the problem of
cache-based side channels can be addressed by re-routing signals from the computation layer through a
cache manager in the control layer.
1 Introduction
Development of high-assurance computing systems is often caught between the competing pressures
to provide complete and precise security policy enforcement and to exploit the abundance of performance
and resources associated with commodity products and parts. High-assurance systems, such as those based
on micro-kernels and virtual machine monitors built using off-the-shelf components, find themselves con-
stantly battling the consequences of commercial pressures to rapidly increase functionality at the expense
of separation, isolation, and protection. Further exacerbating this problem is the fact that, while hardware
resources are now fairly abundant, due to market forces, security functionality is often not considered at the
platform ISA or micro-architecture levels, thus creating exploitable features.
Market pressures drive manufacturers to release products as soon as the required functionality can be
provided, leaving security considerations to the next release. Even when the hardware industry incorpo-
rates significant security enhancements, integrating these mechanisms into a complex design presents many
practical and theoretical problems, driving up the costs and driving out the release schedule. Furthermore,
security assurance processes, such as formal analysis of the security mechanisms, are far more difficult when
the mechanisms are tangled into the product’s functionality.
To divide and conquer these problems, we propose to disentangle the security mechanisms from the
design, consolidating them onto a security overlay, literally a separate layer of circuitry that is stacked on
top of a commodity integrated circuit. The security mechanisms that reside in this overlay can then be
connected to the underlying chip with any number of die-stacking technologies, yet can be left unattached
to enable the manufacturer to continue to sell the un-enhanced product at a lower cost.
Attaching multiple layers of silicon together in 3-D stacks is a new yet already marketed technology [46],
which is being explored by most of the major microprocessor manufacturers [25, 12, 38]. As opposed to
most current 2D circuits, which use only one active layer1 for computation, 3-D circuits contain multiple
1The active layer is the silicon layer where transistors reside, and metal layers are fabricated above that to connect the transistors
together.
1
active layers which are then interconnected using techniques such as inter-die vias (micron-width wires that
are chemically drilled between the layers). In this paper, we argue that an active layer, referred to as a
control plane, specifically dedicated to security is a potentially cost-effective and computationally efficient
methodology for implementing and enforcing a variety of both defensive and offensive security operations.
A control plane provides an opportunity to address security issues in chip multi-processors (CMPs)
that share on-chip caches and other resources among multiple processor cores. Multi-core processors are
already widely deployed [18], and chip manufacturers have proposed chips with upwards of 100 stripped-
down processor cores [22] [29], necessitating the development of techniques to mediate the communication
among the cores in an efficient and secure manner. In this paper, we describe a means for cores in the
traditional computation plane to communicate with and be observed and controlled by a control plane.
Of course this new technology does not come completely for free since some modifications must be
made to the computation plane, and not all designs are amenable to this approach. Specifically, the compu-
tation plane must be designed such that the individual elements of the hardware process state of concern are
observable by the insertion of a post, and the default on-chip communication networks can be overridden,
forcing all security-relevant communication regarding the element up to the control plane so that the desired
policies can be enforced. By selectively introducing posts, which provide the control plane direct electronic
connections to critical signals on the computation plane, we can create passive monitors on any part of
the hardware system state. Active monitoring is enabled through the use of sleep transistors that allow the
control plane to turn off portions of the computation plane. Section 3 describes how these posts, sockets,
and sleep transistors can be achieved in a minimally intrusive manner. Functions for managing the isolated
partitions can then be introduced on the control plane. This makes it possible to isolate computation do-
mains comprised of one or more cores each in the multi-core computation plane and overlay novel security
capabilities onto high performance multi-core systems. Specifically, in this paper we make the following
contributions:
• We provide analysis showing that 3-D integration, while helpful strictly for performance reasons,
offers flexibility for incorporating micro-architectural security mechanisms to enable high-assurance
systems. In Section 2, we describe how the control plane can be fused to a multi-core die and how it
can be effectively used to enforce a broad class of policies.
• As high-assurance systems represent a small fraction of the total multi-core market, we describe a
technique by which the control plane can be integrated in a purely optional and minimally intrusive
manner. In Section 3, we show that with minor modifications to the computation plane, we can force
critical signals up into the control plane where accesses can be monitored and mediated appropriately.
• Finally, in Section 4 we provide a worked example for how the combination of these two layers (the
computation plane and the control plane), working in concert, can help address common security
concerns, including the prevention of cache-based side channel attacks.
Before we get into the circuit-level modifications required of the multi-core layer, we begin with a
discussion of 3-D integration and the opportunities it presents for high-assurance design.
2 3-D Integration of a Security Layer
In this section we provide background on 3-D interconnect, we describe our threat model and assump-
tions, and we describe the advantages and architecture of a control plane.
2.1 3-D Chips
The primary goal of this paper is to explore a new method by which defensive and offensive security
functionality can be added to a processor. Specifically, we propose a new and modular way to add security
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hardware to current and next generation processors through the use of 3-D interconnect. Several 3-D inter-
connect technologies, such as inter-die vias, are currently being evaluated in industry as a means of stacking
multiple chips together. Some potential applications include the stacking of DRAM or bigger caches di-
rectly onto the processor die to alleviate memory pressure [37, 43, 26, 45, 21, 17] and designing stacked
chips of multiple processors [1]. While the details of this technology are more fully described in Section 3,
the main idea is that two pieces of silicon are fused together to form a single chip, and the two active layers
of the silicon are connected through inter-die vias (called posts) which run vertically between them. This
ability to interconnect multiple active layers means that we can consider optionally adding a layer to a pro-
cessor specifically for security which would have access to the security dependent signals of the system.
A processor with this ability could be sold to customers requiring, for example, high assurance security
policy enforcement or other security-specific support, while commodity systems might simply not include
this extra control plane.
Large microprocessor manufacturers are unlikely to add dedicated support for high-assurance because
this market represents such a small portion of their total customer base. The cost to add functionality
directly into a microprocessor is shared by all users, including the vast majority of whom are extremely cost
sensitive and do not have high assurance requirements. By fabricating the control plane with functions that
are complementary to (but separate from) the main processor, stacked interconnect offers the potential to
add security mechanisms on just a small subset of devices without impacting the overall cost of the main
processor. Just to be clear, we are advocating the fabrication of a processor which is always fabricated with
connections built in for security. The difference between the system sold to the cost-sensitive consumer and
the one that is sold to the high assurance customer is only whether a specialized security device is actually
stacked on top of the standard IC or not.
We must therefore consider the cost of the high assurance system with a control plane stacked on top.
There is tangible cost to fabricating systems using 3-D technology as it requires fabricating and testing
the security engine, bonding it to its host layer, fabricating the vias necessary for it to communicate with
the lower chip, and testing the “joined unit.” There is a further cost in terms of the thermal effects. The
physical heat sink of the bonded unit attaches to the surface of the host layer as before, but the additional
computational density may require the use of more expensive heat sink technology. As this is still an
emerging technology, it is difficult to estimate the additional fabrication costs, although many people in the
hardware design community are advocating a move towards 3-D interconnect for performance reasons. If
this is the case, and 3-D integration becomes mainstream, the incremental cost of adding a layer will be
small (especially if one reconfigurable control plane could be used for multiple different families of chip).
The inter-chip 3-D interconnect could take the form of any number of different competing technologies,
including chip-bonding, Multi-chip Modules (MCM) [30], chip-stacking with vias [10, 13], or even wireless
superconnect [31]. While chip-bonding and MCM technology are already used in a variety of embedded
contexts [2, 9], more aggressive interconnect technologies are being heavily researched by several major
industrial consortia. Intel, for example, has been investigating 3-D integration to include extra levels of
cache. If this technology is included to add extra functionality for consumer machines, it would be only an
incremental step to add an additional optional control plane.
2.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
The concurrent processing model (e.g., CMP, SMT, SMP) presents significant security problems regard-
ing the separation of activities in the different execution streams. For products based on this model to reach
their full potential, these security issues must be overcome. The work described in this paper is intended to
contribute to highly effective and efficient solutions for secure processing in concurrent processing environ-
ments. We focus on the CMP architecture in order to achieve concrete measurable results, which may be
applicable to a wide range of architectures and platforms (e.g., embedded, workstations, and hand held).
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In many potential and established applications of CMP, some programs are mutually distrustful, and
others must be assumed to be hostile. An example is programs that interface to both the internet and the
internal enterprise; another is a program that must cryptographically transform highly valuable data but
also interfaces with untrusted software. Therefore, security architectures and mechanisms that can ensure
separation of different security domains, with only appropriate interactions allowed between them, may be
of great value. CMP and SMP are ideal architectures for providing such separation, but core and processor
interference vulnerabilities are inherent in today’s designs.
The threats addressed by our work derive from software with unknown behavior (as opposed to pro-
grams that are concretely understood), whether that software has been provided by the platform or compo-
nent manufacturer, or arrives on the platform during runtime. Another concern we address, orthogonal to
constraining misbehavior of the software, is the need to passively monitor, or audit, the activities of hardware
and software on the computation plane with respect to performance, resource usage, etc.
Outside of the current scope of our work are problems associated with the correctness and integrity of
the base hardware (including components on the chip, board resident components and attached devices),
which could be caused by design and implementation error or malicious behavior during the hardware life-
cycle (e.g., design, fabrication, and integration) or in the field. Active and passive attacks at the hardware
level, such as physical removal or probing of the control plane, are also outside of the threat model.
2.3 Advantages of a Control Plane
A control plane provides several practical advantages. First, it provides the opportunity to utilize po-
tentially older, and therefore cheaper, fabrication technology [28] by bonding with different overlays or via
reconfigurable logic in the overlay. Furthermore, the security mechanisms are not directly integrated into the
computation plane; this makes it more straightforward and less costly to design, build, integrate, and ana-
lyze security. Since the security hardware is separate, the additional security enhancements do not consume
space or processing cycles in the computation plane.
A security overlay also provides the freedom to place specific security mechanisms directly above where
they are needed, without the need for long connections from a security module to the monitored element. For
a given device type, reconfiguration of the security policy mechanisms can be implemented, thus efficiently
supporting different user requirements.
An overlay also provides several clear theoretical benefits. As always, it is critical to protect security
mechanisms, but in this case they may be much less prone to tampering as they are when they are entangled
with the monitored design. By definition, a reference monitor must be tamper-resistant, non-bypassable,
and simple enough to be formally analyzed [8]. The tamper-resistance comes from the fact that the security
mechanisms reside on a physically distinct layer of silicon, and the non-bypassability will be discussed
in Section 3. Furthermore, incompleteness results in logic show that while self-monitoring is problematic,
monitoring a system externally is more feasible and can be more complete and consistent [32] [15]. With the
entire area of the monitoring plane available, security mechanisms can be organized in a way that facilitates
their analysis for completeness and correctness. The overlay could also be used to restructure the system
into an offensive posture when the system is determined to be under attack.
2.4 Architecture of the Control Plane
While insertion of sophisticated security mechanisms for monitoring or policy enforcement into already
complex commodity chips seems unlikely, minimal changes are required to modify their design to accept
a 3-D “snap-on” layer. To be commercially feasible, the changes must be unobtrusive and must require a
minimum amount of additional logic. Our method requires some small changes to the processor design on
the order of a handful of transistors per vertical connection. In addition, the transistors are placed so that the
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Figure 1: This figure shows four vertical posts connecting the computation plane and the security plane. The two inner
posts help to provide the sleep functionality. Signals are rerouted to the control plane through the outer two posts.
A wide range of passive and active security capabilities can be implemented in the control plane. For
example, we can build a reference monitor in this control plane to provide memory protection (i.e., a mother-
board resource reference validation mechanism, or RVM). We can also implement mechanisms for hardware
configuration management, analysis of the computation plane, storage of high integrity code and data (e.g.,
keys), isolated execution (e.g., proprietary algorithms), tagging, and in selected systems, offensive mecha-
nisms. For example, we can exploit the control plane to tag all traffic traveling over a shared bus according
to its source. With our approach, the control plane can manage communication in an efficient and highly
scalable manner. The communication overhead of multiple processor cores places a heavy burden on the
interconnect because the amount of communication grows in proportion to the number of cores.
While there are many possible applications of a control plane, in this paper we focus on its ability
to monitor the computation plane and to override and arbitrate the computation plane, which we discuss
in Section 3. We apply these capabilities to the specific problem of cache-based side channel attacks in
Section 4. Our solution is to force cache bus traffic to take a “detour” through the control plane, where
policy enforcement mechanisms ensure the proper separation of the data.
In systems where resources need to be protected from access by certain users on a persistent basis it is
often required for the protection mechanisms to divide resources into groups. that should be treated alike.
This division can be achieved through physical or logical separation and results in protection domains (i.e.,
policy equivalence classes [24]) with which the protection mechanism can efficiently realize the system
security policy. In the detour approach, we use physical separation of cores on the computation plane to
establish protection domains, and the security mechanisms reside on the control plane.
3 Ramifications to the Computational Layer
The modification to the computation plane to enable the addition of the control plane must be designed so

















Figure 2: A circuit diagram of the sleep transistors
joined planes will require some shared circuitry in order for the control plane to access the information
necessary to perform monitoring and isolation.
3.1 Implementation of Passive Monitors
As discussed in Section 2, one common use of the control plane is simply accessing and analyzing data
from the computation plane. For instance, we may wish to monitor accesses to a particular region of memory
or audit the use of particular set of instructions. To monitor these events, we must understand when such
events are occurring, which necessitates tapping some of the wires from the processor. This requires posts
and vias to the instruction register and memory wires, and gives us direct access to the currently executing
instruction.
This type of passive monitoring is reasonably straightforward to implement in 3-D technology, as it just
requires a set of vias to the top of the computation plane, and then a post from there to the control plane.
Figure 1 shows this on the left hand side of the figure. The area overhead of this passive style monitoring
is analyzed by Mysore et al. [33] in the context of hardware support for debugging. Their conclusion was
that, even with very pessimistic assumptions about the technology, there would be less than a 2% increase
in the total area on the base level and that there would be no noticeable delay added. The small amount of
area overhead is due to the need to save space for the vias across all of the layers of metal. While passive
monitoring provides many benefits, the work of Mysore et al. does not consider anything more.
3.2 Implementation of Active Monitors
While passive monitoring allows for auditing, anomaly detection, and the identification of suspicious
activities, high assurance systems often require strong guarantees about restrictions to overall system behav-
ior. An active monitor enables control of information flow between cores, the arbitration of communication,
and the partitioning of resources.
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The key ability needed to support such functionality is to override connections in the underlying system.
If wires can be overridden by the control plane, then we can force all inter-core communication, memory
accesses, and shared signals to travel to the control plane, where they are subject to both examination and
control. For instance, we can ensure that confidential data being sent between two cores (which traditionally
are forced to traverse a shared bus) is not leaked to an unintended third recipient with access to that bus.
Overriding signals on the computation plane is accomplished in two parts. The first part is to ensure that
the monitor has unfettered access to all the signals (tapping), which is, in essence, the same as the passive
monitoring scenario described above. The second part is to selectively disable those links, essentially turning
off portions of the computation plane (such as a bus). While tapping requires little additional support from
the computation plane (essentially just metal vias), some of the active components in the computation plane
must be modified to support the highly granular modulation.
The difficulty is that we must remove a functionality (the connection between two components) only by
adding a control plane (which cannot physically cut or impede that wire). The computation plane must still
be fully functional without the control plane, yet it needs to be constructed so that by wiring in some extra
circuitry the targeted computation layer can be completely disabled.
3.3 Efficiently Disabling Wires
The easiest option would simply be to insert a ground line onto the wires to be disabled. This has two
problems. First, when the wires are driven by a cores (which should be oblivious to the fact that its signals
are being routed to the control plane), it is driving current right into ground, creating a short. This in turn
consumes a significant amount of power. The second problem is that the wires which are now grounded
were the same ones we were going to tap, effectively making those taps useless.
An alternate method for disabling links is to disable the portion of the chip responsible for driving those
links. While this sounds intrusive, we can in fact leverage an existing circuit technique called power gating
[39]. Support for power gating is added through the addition of sleep transistors placed between a circuit’s
logic and its power/ground connections. The sleep transistors act as switches effectively removing the power
supply from the circuit. The circuit is awake when the transistors are given the correct signal to be turned
on, which provides power to the circuit allowing it to function normally. Alternatively, the sleep transistors
can be given the opposite input and turned off, thus disconnecting the power to the circuit, temporarily
removing all functionality, and effectively putting the circuit to sleep. Sleep transistors are traditionally
used to temporarily disable unused portions of an integrated circuit, saving power by preventing leakage
current [40]; however, their use is also beneficial for providing the isolation an active monitor requires.
The sleep transistors can be managed by the control plane by simply providing a post that connects to
their gate input. Let us go back to our example of turning off the ability of a component in the computation
plane to listen on a bus. To accomplish this, we insert two sleep transistors that can isolate the component
from its power supply. When these sleep transistors are activated, the component is temporarily incapaci-
tated. Tri-state buffers arbitrate the use of the bus lines in a circuit. When implementing sleep transistors on
tri-state buffers, the capability to isolate the section of our system which uses said tri-state buffers to control
bus access is attained.
Adding sleep mode functionality to a circuit requires one PMOS transistor to turn off access to the power
supply (Vdd) and one NMOS transistor to cut the connection to ground (see Figure 2). The gate inputs of
both of these transistors are routed to the control plane through a post. Furthermore, we must insure that the
circuit operates normally (i.e. it is always functional) when the control plane is not included. Therefore, we
tie the gate input of the PMOS (NMOS) sleep transistor to ground (Vdd) through a resistor. This insures that
the sleep transistor allows access to Vdd (ground), and therefore the circuit is always working as intended.
The resistors must be sized appropriately so that when the control plane wishes to turn off the component, it











Figure 3: To mitigate the cache-based side channel problem, traffic destined for the cache bus is forced to take a
detour to the control plane via the vertical posts. The cache manager in the control plane ensures the separation of
each processor’s portion of the L2 cache.
The use of sleep mode holds many benefits at a nominal cost. With only a small amount of added hard-
ware (two transistors and two resistors) and posts for connectivity to the control plane, we can selectively
turn off portions of the computation plane to force adherence to any specific security policy enforced in the
control layer. The exact size of the sleep transistors depends on a variety of factors, which includes the time
to turn off/on the circuit and the amount of leakage power savings. These factors are relatively easily varied
by changing various physical properties of the sleep transistor, e.g. gate length, oxide thickness and doping
[6]. In fact, smaller technology nodes (less than 90 nanometer) need only one sleep transistor due the use of
lower power supply voltage [40]. Finally, many modern chips already employ power gating on their shared
buses. In this case, the amount of added hardware necessary to apply our security measures is decreased, as
only posts to the control plane are needed.
The techniques described in this section provide powerful tools for active and passive monitoring that
can vastly improve the number of possible security measures one may enforce on the chip. For example,
these techniques can enforce isolation on active components by turning specific communication paths on
and off to multiplex access to shared resources. If used appropriately, this can eliminate certain types of side
channels by virtualizing the shared resource. The following section illustrates these monitoring techniques
to detect and ameliorate cache channel side attacks.
4 Example Application: Cache Side Channels
A chip multi-processor contains multiple general-purpose processor cores on a single die. Preventing
processes from “interfering” with each other is an important security requirement. Even if all of the cores
and their L1 and L2 caches are logically isolated, lower-level caches such as the L3 cache may be shared.
A process running on one core can infer the data such as cryptographic keys belonging to another process
by observing either data or instruction cache evictions [4]. The cache therefore is a shared resource that
is a vehicle for information flow between cores. Previous work has focused on cache eviction to close the
cache-related channels. However, it is expensive to replenish the cache from off-chip memory. Further com-
plicating matters is the fact that multi-core systems may access memory in parallel rather than sequentially.
The cache manager on the control plane can implement various techniques to close this channel, such as






Figure 4: This figure shows a logical view of the computation plane after attaching the control plane. The control
plane can prevent Processor1 from accessing Processor2’s portion of the L2 cache and vice-versa.
security domain, and polyinstantiation [27] of cache entries per security domain [44], as we shall see in
Section 5.
We propose to use the control plane to prevent the cache from being used as a vehicle for unintended
information flows. Figure 3 shows how vertical posts can be used to intercept traffic destined for the cache-
bus. In this case, we will add functionality to the control plane to redirect the bus and channel cache traffic
to the control plane which will control interaction between the two processors and the two cache segments;
all access to the cache will be mediated by the control plane. For example, the cache manager can partition
the L2 cache and ensure that each processor can only access its own portion. Figure 4 shows a logical view
of the resulting computation plane after attaching the control plane: Processor1 and its portion of the L2
cache are drawn with a hatched pattern, and Processor2 and its portion of the L2 cache are drawn in white.
Similarly the cache manager could polyinstantiate cache entries to virtualize the cache.
5 Related Work
5.1 Cache-interference Side Channels
On-chip and board-level resource sharing between cores is often used to enhance CMP performance.
However, contention for those resources at the microarchitectural level can provide the basis for “side-
channel cryptanalysis” attacks and other covert timing channels. Code and data caches, as well as the
branch prediction unit, are some of the shared resources that can be exploited in these attacks. [19, 5, 4] In
these cases, one process’s use of the resource perturbs the response time of the next processes that accesses
it, in a predictable manner. Single-core computers with simultaneous multithreading (SMT), and symmetric
multiprocessor (SMP) systems with cache coherency mechanisms, can have similar problems.
Various software and hardware-supported approaches have been reported for preventing cache interfer-
ence. The primary purpose of secure operating systems is to manage shared resources securely, so it is no
surprise that the cache problem has been addressed in software. Cache interference on uni-processors has
often been dealt with by “normalizing” the cache (e.g., evicting all cache lines) between execution of differ-
ent security domains, including mechanisms to avoid doing so unnecessarily. [16] However, this approach is
expensive, and is ineffective for processors supporting concurrent execution (CMP, SMT, and SMP), unless
access to the cache can be serialized.
One approach to prevent resource contention in a concurrent execution model is to utilize separate
physical caches for each core, or provide separate virtual caches within the physical cache (if virtual cache
support is available in hardware). [36] [44] Various forms of cache disablement are possible, ranging from
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turning it off, to turning it off for certain cores or processes, to turning off the eviction and filling of the cache
through use of the processor no-fillmode. The latter can be used to create sensitive sections [34] of code that
could not interfere with the cache behavior observable by other cores or processors – assuming that the code
is not interruptible or that the previous processor mode is restored on interrupt, as otherwise, other processes
might sense the change to the state of the processor (i.e., to “no-fill”), creating another covert channel. [11]
Specific cryptographic attacks can be defeated or minimized through lowering the bandwidth of the
cache channel, such as through nondeterministic ordering of access to cache [35] which makes detailed
cache-use profiling difficult; and nondeterministic cache placement [42] [36] or nondeterministic polyin-
stantiation [14] of cache entries, [44] which, while the specific cause of the interference may be masked,
still allows detection of cache misses caused by another process.
The 3-D approach has the advantage of being able to implement many of these schemes for resolving
cache contention, while doing it in an isolated environment, without modification to the processor ISA.
5.2 Security in CMPs
There is a great deal of prior work in the area of security for CMPs. Aggarwal et al. have devised
a configurable isolation technique for CMPs [7], in which they divide processor resources into isolated
domains for improved security, reliability, and performance. A 3-D architecture provides the ability to
implement such a configurable isolation strategy with less radical modifications to the commodity processor.
Shi et al. provide security and fault recovery in CMPs with a technique in which one core checks for
corruption in the other cores, and the system efficiently recovers compromised cores [41]. Their technique
was designed for use in network services, which require high reliability. A 3-D architecture provides the
opportunity to implement such a fault recovery technique without the need to sacrifice an entire core on the
computation plane.
5.3 Communication in CMPs
Due to the demands placed on the interconnect by multiple cores, the design of an efficient interconnect
is critical to any CMP, and there is much prior work on communication in CMPs. Abad et al. have pro-
posed a rotary router for a packet-switched network-on-a-chip [3]. Their rotary router uses two independent
“rings,” and packets can either flow clockwise or counterclockwise. Kim et al. have proposed a flattened
butterfly router for high-radix networks-on-a-chip [20]. To address the overhead of complex routers in
packet-switched networks-on-a-chip, Kumar et al. have proposed a routing strategy called express virtual
channels [23]. By redesigning the routers, their technique improves throughput by bypassing intermediate
routers. A 3-D architecture provides an opportunity to further improve the efficiency and security of CMP
interconnects.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Through the techniques in the paper, 3-D integration offers the ability to decouple the development of
high assurance security mechanisms from the economics of high performance computing hardware. We
provide novel methods by which signals on the computation plane can be overridden by the control plane,
enforcing that the monitors on the control plane will be both isolated and non-bypassable. The longer term
goal of this work is to help precipitate a renaissance in hardware-assisted security by changing the funda-
mental trade-offs. We describe various services for the control plane as well as a technique for integrating
this plane in a purely optional and minimally intrusive manner to selected points on a commodity integrated
circuit. We show how this technique can be applied to address cache-based side channel attacks in chip
multi-processors. While the specifics of the example we present shows only how cache side-channel attacks
might be mitigated, and certainly there are many other countermeasures and techniques to help deal with this
problem, it is the general approach of augmented silicon for security that we believe is our biggest contribu-
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tion. Indeed many other hardware-assisted approaches may become feasible through this method including
tagging, hardware reference monitors, deep analysis of both the hardware and software of the computation
plane, storage assistance for high-integrity code and data, and isolated execution.
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